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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims at assessing the impacts of recent economic liberalisation on an important 
subset of the Brazilian airline industry: the air shuttle market on the route Rio de Janeiro – 
São Paulo, a pioneer service created in 1959. In order to estimate structural relationships of 
the competition model, a product differentiated setting with conduct parameter was designed. 
Results permitted inferring about a rupture in the degree of firms' heterogeneity and in the 
extent of the deviation from Nash behaviour due to regulatory reform, as well as estimation of 
pertinent route-level cost information. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims at developing a competition model in order to assess the impacts of recent 
economic liberalisation in a relevant subset of the Brazilian airline industry: the air shuttle 
service on the route Rio de Janeiro - São Paulo. This market was where the first air shuttle in 
the world, the ‘Ponte Aérea’, was created, in 1959, by an agreement of airline managers, and 
which dominated the airport-pair linking the city centres of the cities for almost forty years. 
Air shuttles are usually characterised by very frequent service, walk-on flights with even 
intervals, no reservations and short-haul markets. This concept is nowadays widespread in the 
airline industry, usually providing service for highly time-sensitive passengers, with well-
known examples being the Eastern Airlines’ Boston-New York-Washington and the Iberia’s 
Madrid-Barcelona. These airlines were pioneers in launching air shuttles in the United States 
(1961) and in Europe (1974), respectively1. 
The competition model presented here was developed to represent the rivalry and strategic 
interdependence among airlines in a shuttle market with product differentiation. Firms are 
assumed to play a static oligopoly game in which price is the strategic choice variable. As 
route level costs are non-observable by the econometrician, the approximation of Brander and 
Zhang (1990) is then performed in parallel with the estimation of first-order conditions for 
firm' profit maximisation.  
In order to estimate the impacts of liberalisation in the air shuttle market, this paper performs 
analyses in two main directions: competitive conduct and product differentiation. 
Firstly, it makes use of the conduct parameter approach (as in Porter, 1984, and Genesove and 
Mullin, 1998) to infer the extent of deviation from Nash equilibrium, and the behaviour of 
airlines during the process of quasi-deregulation, especially with respect to the new strategies 
emerged in the post-liberalisation period - such as demand segmentation and frequent flyer 
programmes -, some exogenous shocks - such as a fire in one of the endpoint airports 
                                               
1 Eastern Airlines’ shuttle was purchased by Donald Trump in 1989 and became The Trump Shuttle. This service 
was operated by USAir after it went bankrupt in 1992, and was finally acquired by US Airways in 1998. 
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(February 1998) and a shift in costs due to currency devaluation (January 1999)-, and the 
interference of macroeconomic authorities in airline's pricing freedom. 
In conjunction with conduct analysis, it also investigates a rupture in the degree of product 
differentiation due to liberalisation, by making use of an index of heterogeneity (as in Singh 
and Vives, 1984). 
The paper is divided into the following sections: firstly, some characteristics of the Brazilian 
airline industry are given, along with a historical background of the economic liberalisation 
performed by country's aviation authorities. Then, main elements of air shuttle markets are 
provided and the evolution of the Rio de Janeiro - São Paulo air shuttle is described, what is 
followed by the theoretical structure and empirical model. Finally, main results are presented, 
along with the conclusions. 
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Brazilian Airline Industry 
The domestic air transportation in Brazil is a fast-growing industry. According to the 
Department of Civil Aviation, there were 20.5 million passenger-kilometres flown in 2000 
against 11.8 million in 1992, representing growth of more than nine percent per year, a much 
higher rate than the country's overall economy. 
As with most airline industries around the world, Brazilian air transport is rather dependent on 
both domestic and international economic conditions on account of derived demand 
characteristics. In fact, this situation is even aggravated due to usual currency exchange 
instability in the country, which usually affects not only demand for international travel, but 
also aircraft lease, maintenance, and fuel costs, causing recurrent financial crises. Besides 
that, airlines face very high taxation, with overall rates around thirty-five percent, compared 
with 7.5% for North American and 9% for European airlines, and much higher fuel tax2  
(Airfinance Journal, 2000), what makes them usually demanding for governmental help.  
One of the most relevant characteristics of Brazilian airline industry is the gradual and 
continuous process of economic liberalisation that has been undertaken  since early nineties. 
Next section provides details of the measures towards deregulation led by Department of Civil 
Aviation, the country's aviation authority.  
2.2 Economic Liberalisation and the Path Towards Quasi-Deregulation 
Economic liberalisation of the industry started at the beginning of the nineties within a 
broader governmental program for deregulation of country's economy. Most important 
measures undertaken so far are described in the summary of policies regarding the sector 
during the past thirty years, in Appendix 1. 
                                               
2 They actually pay twice as much for fuel due to fuel tax (Airfinance Journal, 2000). 
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 The most representative phase of the regulatory period was from 1973 to 1986, where 
regulation was performed along with mechanisms of development policy. In fact, the 
government accomplished a framework of "four national airlines and five regional airlines" in 
order to both regulate and promote industry's development, in a policy completely enacted by 
1976. Prices were fixed by authorities, entry was banned, and the country was divided into 
five main monopolies for regional airlines. Besides that, competition between regionals and 
national (trunk) airlines was virtually absent.  
From 1986 to 1992, the government started being more intrusive in terms of macroeconomic 
interference in the industry, especially with respect to stabilisation policy targeting. This 
policy was remarkable in terms of interfering in all infrastructure industries in the country and 
led to artificially low real prices, which caused great losses for airlines.  
Liberalisation effectively started from 1992 on, although some measures of deregulation were 
already present since 1989 (fare bounds, for example). During this First Round of 
Liberalisation, regionals' monopolies were abolished, with exception to the airport-pairs 
linking city centres of four major cities3 (called "special" airport-pairs, SAP). What is more, 
the policy of "four nationals & five regionals" was also abolished, and thus entry was 
stimulated by the authorities, what led to a wave of new small airlines in the market. 
Also, there were now reference prices and bounds of -50% up to +32% of their values, and 
price competition was now seen as "healthy" for the industry, and was therefore encouraged. 
This can be regarded as a period of inactive stabilisation policy controls, as there was no need 
for the macroeconomic authorities to interfere in the market: no pressure for price increase 
due to higher competition, and lower instability in the costs side, as currency exchanges - the 
main source of variation in costs - were under control. 
In the late nineties the aviation authorities decided removing two relevant regulatory devices 
remaining in the market: the fare bounds and the exclusivity of operations of SAPs by 
regionals. This generated the Second Round of Liberalisation (enacted in Dec/97-Jan/98), 
what triggered much strategic interaction by airlines, with intense price and frequency 
competition. 
                                               
3 São Paulo (CGH), Rio de Janeiro (SDU), Belo Horizonte (PLU) and Brasília (BSB). 
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This phenomenon was exacerbated on the Rio de Janeiro - São Paulo route, the country's 
densest flow linking its best known cities. One very relevant subset of this market is the 
airport-pair Santos Dumont (SDU, Rio de Janeiro) - Congonhas (CGH, São Paulo), the most 
important of the SAPs. Notably, the SDU-CGH airport-pair is closely associated with the 
competition of multi-frequency, walk-on, air shuttles in the market. In fact, it was there was 
the first air shuttle in the world was created, the ‘Ponte Aérea’ (airlift4), in 1959 - two years 
before the pioneer service of Eastern Airlines shuttle in the United States.  
With the gradual deregulation measures of the nineties, the agreement started losing strength. 
After years of operations under the approval of the regulators5, its dominance started being 
criticised, especially due to fears of market power exercise in the newly liberalised market 
conditions. In fact, when regional airlines were allowed to enter the route, in 1989, the ‘Ponte 
Aérea’ was seen more as a cartel of major airlines than a regular pooling agreement. 
With the Second Round of Liberalisation, the consequent increase in the contestability led to 
relevant boost in price competition, and even the fire at SDU, in February 1998, did not 
represent an impediment to it6. Airlines started having their own strategies on the route, in a 
process that ultimately led to the dissolution of the forty-year-old cartel, announced in June 
1998. 
The end of the cartel did not represent an end of air shuttle features on the route. On the 
contrary, new air shuttles were created by the existing airlines, in order to attract highly time-
sensitive demand and to cope with increasingly fiercer competition. The next section provides 
a more detailed description of market’s main characteristics after liberalisation. 
Another relevant characteristic of the period was the strong instability of currency exchanges 
(US dollar), especially the shock of January 1999, which represented major increase in firm's 
operational costs. As the pressures for price increase in the whole economy were strong, 
                                               
4 The term "airlift" first appeared in the city of Berlin during the Cold War, "by virtue of the necessity created by 
the blockade imposed by the Soviet Union" (Aviation Daily, 2002). 
5 Since its creation, the Brazilian aviation authorities considered the agreement beneficial for consumers because 
of the market expansion it generated. As prices were regulated and entry was banned, it operated as a natural, 
state-controlled, monopoly on the route, being an exception to regional's monopolies in SAP markets. 
6 In fact, prices fell by 27% during the closing of SDU. 
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macroeconomic authorities started interfering in the industry again. This represented relevant 
constraint to airlines' strategies, as they could not increase prices whenever they wanted; 
besides that, antitrust authorities were now closely monitoring the market. 
Finally, in 2001, most of the remaining economic regulation was removed, as well as the 
macroeconomic interference. Thus, airlines could set their prices freely from that period on. It 
can be called a 'quasi-deregulation' period, as entry, price and frequencies were almost 
entirely liberalised.  
3. MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
3.1 Definitions and General Elements  
Air shuttles usually represent major air corridors linking important political, economical, 
social or cultural centres with a very high traffic density - the reason why they can be very 
relevant markets to competing airlines. According to Teodorovic (1985) the main 
characteristics of this sort of routes are: 
i. equal intervals between two successive departures; and 
ii. the impossibility of reserving tickets in advance. 
Following this definition, it is clear that a typical air shuttle configuration requires the airlines 
to provide one or more guarantees to passengers, in order to assure that "[either they] will 
depart on the first departing plane, or that within a certain probability, [they] will depart on 
the first departing plane, or that [they] will depart on the next departing plane if cannot get a 
vacant seat on the first departing plane, etc" (Teodorovic, 1985)7.  
In practice, air shuttle markets are characterised by very frequent service8, with intervals 
between flights from fifteen minutes to an hour (multi-frequency markets), depending on the 
                                               
7 Airlines can add other operational guarantees to the typical air shuttle guarantee. For example, in the Boston-
New York-Washington market Delta Shuttle commits with 3 guarantees (Triple Guarantee Policy), whereas US 
Airways Shuttle with five. 
8 US Airways Shuttle, for example, flies 24 daily roundtrips between Boston and LaGuardia, and 14 daily 
roundtrips between LaGuardia and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (October 2002). 
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time of day, and commonly operated on short-haul domestic routes, such as Boston-New 
York (258 km, with Delta and USAirways Shuttles), Madrid-Barcelona (483 km, with Iberia's 
"Puente Aéreo"), Paris Orly-Toulouse (574 km, with the extinct Air Inter Europe's "La 
Navette"), etc. 
It is important to notice that one might find slight variations in air shuttles around the world, 
specially related to the "walk-on" features - that is, the last-minute availability without having 
to book -, due to country-specific airline legislation, which may impose relevant constraints9. 
In order to cope with that, airlines have nowadays developed mechanisms of increasing 
customer's flexibility of time, by introducing automatic ticketing machines and dedicated 
boarding gates available at airports. Irrespective of these variations, the main idea of shuttles 
is still to serve a demand that is very time-sensitive and business-purposes related, in a 
relatively ordered way (equal intervals). 
The air shuttle market SDU - CGH is formed by central airports in Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo, in a non-stop flight of approximately 50 minutes (365 km). As with most dense routes, 
it is notable for its very high service levels, with average distance between flights being lower 
than 25 minutes (August 1998); actually, this could be down to 17 minutes during peak hours. 
The airport-pair is a subset of the market consisted of the route linking the cities, which 
includes International Airports of Galeão / Antônio Carlos Jobim (GIG, in Rio de Janeiro) and 
Guarulhos (GRU, in São Paulo). Nevertheless, among the four possible airport-pair 
compositions, GIG-GRU is the most relevant alternative to SDU-CGH. Table 1 presents how 
demand distributes across airport-pairs in the city-pair market: 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 For example, in the Eastern Air Shuttle case, passengers could buy tickets on board, whereas in the Brazilian 
‘Ponte Aérea’ this was not permitted by authorities (nowadays it is possible to make reservations in CGH-SDU 
market, but it is still not allowed to make purchases on board). 
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Table 1 – Demand Distribution across Airport-Pairs10 
Airport-Pair
GIG-GRU 396,889 26.4% 359,777 14.8%
GIG-CGH 3,793 0.3% 183,935 7.6%
SDU-GRU 3,166 0.2% 7,010 0.3%
SDU-CGH 1,101,390 73.2% 1,879,428 77.3%
Total RJ-SP 1,505,238 2,430,150
1 SEM 1997 1 SEM 2001
 
Other alternatives for travellers in the airport-pair include coach and telecommunications. The 
former represents the only transport alternative to air travel, due to non-availability of a rail 
system for passengers11. The latter is usually reported as relevant by the transport literature, 
and air shuttles may be especially influenced: “During the economic downturn of the early 
1990s [in the United States] (...) many businesses were relying on facsimile machines, 
electronic mail, and videoconferences in place of air travel” (O’Connor, 1995). Besides that, 
telecommunication industry was privatised and liberalised during the mid nineties in Brazil, 
and the consequent fall in tariffs made this alternative even more attractive. 
Although indeed relevant, the three aforementioned alternatives (GIG-GRU, coach and 
telecommunications) were not explicitly regarded in this study, and the main reason is the 
following: to be able to focus on the behaviour of the typical traveller of SDU-CGH market, 
which means a given (and homogeneous) standard of disutility to travel times. Besides that, 
considering GIG-GRU would cause estimation problems due to the great amount of 
passengers in flight connections (domestic and international) observed12. Coach travellers can 
be disregarded using the same reasoning, especially if one takes into account that travel time 
is more than seven times longer (almost six hours). Finally, telecommunication effects can be 
seen as affecting only in the long run, whereas present analysis deals with short run only.  
                                               
10 In number of passengers; source: Department of Civil Aviation. 
11 A very different situation when compared to the competition provided by train operators in the shuttle markets 
New York-Washington (Amtrak's "Acela Express") and Tokyo-Osaka (Shinkansen "bullet trains"). 
12 Unfortunately, the data provided by DAC does not disaggregate traffic into direct trips and flight connections. 
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3.2 Evolution from "Classic" to Product-Differentiated Air Shuttle 
The main reasons of establishing an air shuttle service are the provision of higher service 
levels to passengers, and the soothing of competition between flights13. The former is reached 
by providing departure times closer to passengers' preferred times due to the more even 
spread (and dominance) of schedule over an operating day. The latter is reached by the 
increase in departure-time differentiation, that is, instead of having clusters of similar 
departure times, there is an increase in the distance between them, in order to maximise 
spatial product differentiation (as described by Borenstein and Netz, 1999). 
On the other hand, however, air shuttle operations may be a very relevant source of product 
homogeneity in a given market: one can hypothesise the representative consumer for air 
shuttle service as the one who is always interested in getting the first flight available. As 
Teodorovic (1985) describes: "After establishing the air shuttle, a large number of passengers 
will become familiar with the services offered. Most of them will adjust their arrival at the 
airport to the service, trying to minimize waiting time". This interaction between supply and 
demand can, ceteris paribus, make airlines' products homogeneous by letting passengers 
make their choice based only in their desired departure time, regardless the name and specific 
attributes of the airline they are travelling with.   
Therefore, one should expect the degree of product differentiation in an air shuttle market to 
be determined by the combination of the two aforementioned effects, that is, the increase of 
departure-time differentiation and the increase in passengers' desire to get the first flight 
irrespective of the airline. What is more, the existence of price regulation and additional 
airline coordination (eg. by ticket endorsement14), can be decisive in terms of determining 
market outcome, ie., either product homogeneity or product heterogeneity. 
                                               
13 One can observe that air shuttles are very likely to engender competitive advantage for participant firms, as 
they create reputation of very frequent and flexible service; this can be demonstrated by Iberia's legal battle of 
eight years in Spain's Supreme Court in order to be allowed to use the term "Puente Aereo" as its own brand 
name, and then, preventing its competitors from using it, on the route between Madrid and Barcelona (Aviation 
Daily, 2002). The air shuttle concept, in this case, represented first mover advantage. 
14 That is, a common policy between existing competitors permitting any traveller holding a ticket issued by one 
airline to be able to go to the ticket counter of any airline, have the ticket endorsed (acknowledged), and board a 
flight provided by this airline. 
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Indeed, one can observe that air shuttles are potential candidates for coordination of flight 
schedules among airlines, mainly because it requires large scale of operations in terms of very 
frequent service. In order to spread flight times in an evenly way across the relevant time 
period of a day, without causing much increase in departure intervals, conjoint operations is 
usually considered a reasonable alternative, either by airlines or even by regulators. For 
example, the Tokyo-Osaka shuttle service is performed jointly by All Nippon Airways, Japan 
Airline and Japan Air System, with codeshare agreement, ticket endorsement and specific 
website for e-ticketing. 
If we consider a shuttle route with price regulation (equal fares across airlines) and full ticket 
endorsement, this could be undoubtedly regarded as market with homogeneous product. This 
situation is defined here as "classic" air shuttle market.  
In the CGH-SDU case, the aviation authority indeed allowed the shuttle agreement since its 
creation, and, what is more, made it an official monopoly for years. During the eighties, VRG, 
TBA, VSP and CRZ operated this market with full ticket endorsement and common ticket 
counters at both airports, and in a pooling agreement, the "Ponte Aérea". This could be 
undoubtedly considered a "classic" shuttle period.  
In the nineties, however, with the liberalisation measures and the allowed entry of regionals 
on the route, the market gradually evolved from "classic" to a more modern concept of 
shuttle. Especially in 1998, with the Second Round of Liberalisation and the fare war of 
March, airlines started introducing several elements of product differentiation, launched after 
the post-fire restoration of SDU15: firstly, "Ponte Aérea" was split into individual shuttles; and 
secondly, explicit efforts of segmentation were then performed. Indeed, one could observe 
VRG and TAM offering frequent flyer programmes, more flight time options, higher peak-
dominance, better service levels at the airports, newer aircrafts, etc., focusing on the more 
frequent consumers - which can be called "loyal" travellers segment -, whereas VSP and TBA 
providing a basic service with deep discounts, focusing on the less frequent consumers - "non 
loyal" travellers segment. For more details of firms' products in the market since August 
1998, check Appendix 2. 
                                               
15 SDU was closed for almost six months due to a fire in February 1998. Airlines were then transferred to GIG 
until SDU's fully restoration, which happened in August 1998. 
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In order to reveal the major elements of product differentiation in the post-liberalisation 
period, a survey was performed with passengers on the route (described in Oliveira, 2003). 
Results of the field research were very supportive of the idea of the existence of two segments 
of passengers. They are detailed in Appendix 3.  
In summary, one can observe the existence of two major periods in the air shuttle market after 
the first liberalisation measures of the early nineties: one, with competition between "Ponte 
Aérea" and the regionals, prevailing until mid 1998; and the other, with competition between 
firms in two niches: the "loyal" and the "non-loyal" travellers segment. Both periods 
represented a complete rupture with "classic" standards of operations. Table 2 permits 
comparisons between periods: 
Table 2 - Evolution of Product Differentiation in the Market 
Characteristic
1. "Classic" 
Air Shuttle
2. Air Shuttle with Some 
Product Differentiation
3. Air Shuttle with 
Higher Product 
Differentiation
Period Eighties Nineties Until Mid 1998 From Mid 1998 on
Groups of Competitors
Only "Ponte 
Aérea"
"Ponte Aérea" versus 
Regionals
Loyal versus Non-
Loyal Segment
Full endorsement Present
Present only among 
"Ponte Aérea" airlines
Absent
Common Counters Present
Present only among 
"Ponte Aérea" airlines
Absent
Price Competition Absent Present Present
Frequent Flyer Programs Absent Absent Present
 
Although it is clear from the discussion above that product differentiation was present both 
before and after the Second Phase of liberalisation (in the first case, between Ponte Aérea and 
the regionals, and in the second case, between VRG-TAM and VSP-TBA), the degree of 
product differentiation and the existence of a rupture in it due to the Second Round of 
Liberalisation is still an empirical matter. They will be key points of investigation in the 
theoretical and empirical modelling of Sections 4 and 5. 
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4. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE 
Consider static price competition in a product-differentiated setting, with two groups of firms. 
Prices as choice variables are also assumed by Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996)16, and 
"duopoly" assumption is directly derived from the grouping of competitors described in last 
section (Table 2). Demand function of each firm is the following: 
( )dkijkiki eHYppqq ,,,,, b= , i = {1,2} (1) 
Where qki is quantity of firm k of group i, pki and pj are, respectively, own and rival's prices, 
Yki is a vector of firm-specific demand shifters, H is a vector of market demand shifters, b are 
unknown parameters and ed are disturbances. 
Let us define Y as the measure of the degree of firm's homogeneity in the market, as in Dixit 
(1979) and Singh and Vives (1984): 
2211
2112
bb
bb
=Y  
(2) 
Where b11 and b22 are own-price sensitivity of demand, b12 and b21 are cross-price sensitivity 
of demand, for firms on groups 1 and 2, respectively. Y is assumed to be between 0 
(completely independent groups) and 1 (completely homogeneous groups), and thus the 
higher is the index, the higher is the degree of product homogeneity in the market. Y permits 
checking for rupture in perceived differentiation among groups due to liberalisation - one of 
the main targets of this paper.  
Suppose now that each firm faces a total cost function, TC, in the sistemwide level, that is, in 
the whole industry, considering an aggregation of all domestic routes: 
( )ckikikiki eZWQTCTC ,,,, g=  (3) 
                                               
16 In opposition to Marín (1995), Captain and Sickles (1997), Brander and Zhang (1990), which assume 
competition in quantities. 
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Where Qki is the systemwide quantity (measured in the whole domestic segment of Brazilian 
airline industry) of firm k of group i, Wki is the vector of factor prices paid by firm ki, Zki is a 
firm-specific cost shifter vector, g are unknown parameters and ec are disturbances. 
Marginal cost can therefore be developed as: 
( )g,,,1 kikikiki ZWQTCMC =  (4) 
Whereas in this case one can observe marginal cost at the sistemwide level, this is not true at 
the route level17. As the observable variables are only those related to the total cost function in 
the systemwide level, that is, the global figures for the domestic airline market provided by 
DAC, some sort of approximation is needed. The approach used was to "convert (...) overall 
cost per passenger to a route specific cost" of Brander and Zhang (1990)18. Suppose the 
following (non-observable) route-level marginal cost: 
( ) ( )lgl ,,,,, kikikikiki ZWQmcMCmcmc ==  (5) 
Where l provides the conversion of MCki (overall marginal cost) to mcki (route-level marginal 
cost), developed in the following way:  
l-
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=
ki
kiki
d
d
dMCmc
 
(6) 
Where d is the airport-pair distance and kid  is firm ki’s average stage length. l is a route-
specific parameter; it accounts for the phenomenon of “cost taper” and means that “total cost 
per passenger-mile drops as the length of the trip grows” (O’Connor, 1995). Cost taper may 
be a relevant feature especially within the context of short-hauls, due to higher costs per seat-
mile – known as the “short-haul problem” and which usually affects air shuttle markets19. 
                                               
17 Usually, as Brander and Zhang (1990) describe, the appropriate operational definition of route-specific 
marginal costs is "far from obvious", and one has to develop proxies for it, as for ex., Douglas and Miller (1974). 
18 Also in Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1997). 
19 O’Connor (1995) mentions the demand and costs side of the short-haul problem: “Not only is the cost per seat-
mile higher for shorter stage lengths, but the demand is highly elastic (...) since alternative modes of 
transportation, notably the private automobile, are relatively attractive over shorter distances”. Air shuttle 
markets, however, may not feel the demand effect so intensively, as they are characterised by highly time-
sensitive and price-inelastic passengers.   
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Following Bresnahan (1989), I define perceived marginal revenue (pmr)20 as: 
kikikiki pDqpmr
1
1
-+= q    ,    kiki pqD ¶¶=1  (7) 
Where qki is the conduct parameter, an index of the competitive nature of firm k in a given 
group i. q is usually known as the firm's conjecture, although here I interpret it in the same 
way as Slade (2001), that is, "as misspecification parameter that measure the extent of the 
deviation from the null hypothesis of static Nash-equilibrium behavior". 
Basically, if firms' conduct is consistent with Nash behaviour, then one would expect each 
firm's marginal revenue to equate marginal costs (qki =1, for all i). The lower the q, the more 
competitive firms are and, in one extreme, q = 0 represents marginal cost pricing. On the 
other hand, the higher q, the more collusive firms are and, in the limit, there will be perfect 
collusion. Both cases (that is, q < 1 and q > 1) shall be regarded as deviations from non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
By developing the profit maximisation problem in a similar way of Porter (1984), and using 
(1), (6) and (7) one can reach the following first-order condition21: 
1
1
--
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=
ii
i
ki
kiki d
d
dMCp
h
ql
 
(8) 
Where hii is the own-price elasticity of demand of firms belonging to group i.  
Equations (1), (3) and (8) can be estimated as a system and conduct parameters are identified 
and can be then compared with Nash benchmark. Above all, if one considers an empirical 
matter to infer the behaviour of firms after liberalisation, as discussed before, this framework 
proves to be quite useful, as it permits checking for structural changes in q before and after 
the regulatory reform, in the same approach of the analysis of Y. 
                                               
20 It is "perceived" because it depends on the extent to which firms recognise the distinction between its demand, 
its marginal revenue, and market marginal revenue functions, what is captured by q. Check Bresnahan (1989) 
and Appendix 4. 
21 Algebraic developments can be checked in Appendix 4. 
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
5.1 Data Discussion 
Data for this model is composed by a cross section of airlines in the airport-pair CGH-SDU, 
over time, in a panel, as described in Table 1. All information - published and non-published - 
was kindly supplied by Brazil’s Department of Civil Aviation (DAC) and collected in the 
period Oct/2001 - Jan/2002. Descriptive statistics of most relevant variables can be found in 
Appendix 7 (Tables A.3 and A.4). 
Table 3 - Data Details 
Characteristic Description
   Market
Two directional one-way airport-pairs: SDU-CGH and CGH-
SDU (single trips).
   Period Jan/1997 - Oct/2001 (58 months).
   Missing Data months of SDU closed: filled with GIG data (Feb/1998-Jul/1998)
   Observations 466 (Pre-Liberalisation:190, Post-Liberalisation:276)
   Firms VRG (116 Obs.), VSP (116), TAM (116), TBA (80), RSL (38)
 
Here I follow the approach of directional origin-destination markets of Berry, Carnall and 
Spiller (1996), that is, considering both CGH-SDU and SDU-CGH data. However, it must be 
emphasised that in that paper they could observe round-trip traffic, which is not the case in the 
present data sample. By having that kind of disaggregation, the authors were able to allow for 
"characteristics of the origin city to affect demand" - a phenomenon considerably less visible 
in this case. 
Therefore, as the data set permits observing only single trip, one-way markets, one has to be 
aware of inevitable crossed-effects in traffic generation, that is, the characteristics of the 
demand in one one-way market having considerable influence in the demand for the other 
one-way market. This is explained as part of the traffic observed in one market not being 
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generated there, but being merely an extension of the traffic originated in the other market, 
and vice versa. 
This can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose two round-trip markets unobserved by 
the econometrician: A-B-A (with, say, 70% of total traffic on the route A-B) and B-A-B (with 
30%). If, as in the present case, data available only permits observing the one-way markets A-
B and B-A, then it is clear that, under normal circumstances, the composition of both A-B and 
B-A will be approximately 35% and 15%, that is, respectively, half of A-B-A and half of B-
A-B22. Thus there is strong tendency for the markets to be homogeneous, and then, to have the 
same O-D composition in terms of round-trip markets. The example permits arriving at the 
conclusion that having the disaggregation into one-way markets permits the econometrician to 
duplicate her sample size (and then having higher statistical significance), without loosing 
information or deteriorating characteristics of the whole market. In this sense, having data for 
two one-way markets is the same of having data for one market for twice the period, with the 
advantage that the second (extended) period does not contain other exogenous shocks than the 
ones that already exist in the first one. 
Another very important peculiarity of the data set is the existence of a gap due to the fire in 
SDU in Feb/1998, as mentioned before; this forced the airport to be closed for six months and 
airlines to cease virtually all operations from or to it. In the majority of the cases (air shuttle 
included) the alternative was to transfer flights to the international airport, GIG, what made 
CGH-GIG data potential candidate for data filling purposes.  
Actually, the only reason of not taking into account GIG-CGH data would be related to the 
bias that could have been caused by the competition with the existing airlines in the airport-
pair. This matter is not relevant, however, because GIG-CGH was relatively unexplored 
before the fire at SDU (the only airline that operated in that market in Jan/1998 was VSP with 
less than 300 pax, a very small figure if compared to more than 85,000 total pax in February). 
                                               
22 What is meant by "normal circumstances" here is the number of people travelling only one-way - and then not 
returning - in one given month not being significant. Of course it is important to be aware of the fact that a small 
amount of trips always begin in one month and end in one of the immediate ones, but this phenomenon tends to 
happen in a reduced scale in such a market where passengers usually have very short stay at destination. 
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Another very important caution about the data is related to codeshare agreements: actually, 
when two airlines form an alliance on the route, the econometrician cannot observe how many 
passengers carried by one were really this firm's buyers, simply because here data only 
permits observing traffic by airline and not revenue tickets by airline (as in most US studies of 
airline industry). 
5.2 Empirical Specification, Estimation and Results 
5.2.1 Model Specification and Estimation 
I assume log-linear versions of (1), (3) and (8). Empirical counterparts of those equations are 
presented below, and details of variables can be found in Appendix 5. 
Demand function is estimated as follows: 
dh
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(9) 
Where NPASki is the number of passengers carried by firm k of group i; Pki is the price of 
firm ki; Pj is the average price of firms in group j; GDP is an index of real gross domestic 
product; SHSEATSki is firm ki's share of total seats available; CDSHVPTB controls for the 
effects of the codeshare VSP-TBA (Aug/98-May/99), on, respectively, their own and rivals' 
demand. Finally, the DFIRMh variables are used to control for inter-firm heterogeneity in the 
fixed-effects procedure; ed are disturbances. 
In order to estimate total costs as in equation (2), I employed a less general concept of 
"sistemwide level". By taking the advantage of the fact that DAC provided sistemwide data 
disaggregated by aircraft type, the procedure followed here was to only consider the flight 
equipment specific for the air shuttle market (B737-300, B737-500, A-319 and FK-100). This 
permitted avoiding bias due to different firm-specific fleet composition in the whole-system 
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level, which could be especially harmful to the estimation of l in the pricing equation23. Total 
costs are then estimated as Cobb-Douglas functions: 
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(10) 
Where TCkim is total cost of firm k of group i, for the aircraft m, and FUELkim, MAINTkim, 
CREWkim, RENTALkim, and CHARGESkim represent, respectively, proxies for (aircraft-
specific) unit price of fuel, maintenance, labour, aircraft rental, and airport charges for firm ki. 
Qkim is sistemwide output (measured in available seat-kilometres) of firm ki for the aircraft m. 
AB and FK are dummy variables to control for changes in output elasticity due to different 
aircrafts (Fokker FK-100 and Airbus A-319). I also include dummies for firm-specific fixed 
effects. Disturbances are denoted by ec. 
And finally, the empirical counterpart of the first-order condition (8) is the following: 
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(11) 
Where RELDISTki represents d / kid  of (8); FIRE is a dummy that controls for the period of 
closed SDU; ALWDISC97 accounts for the period of discounts by Ponte Aérea before the 
Second Round of Liberalisation, in 1997; HHISEATS is the Herfindhal index of 
                                               
23 Brander and Zhang (1990) mention that "(...) marginal cost may vary across routes on the basis of other factors 
aside from distance. It might be argued that the marginal opportunity cost of a passenger depends on how well 
the route fits into the airline's overall network, on average load factors, on the type of aircraft used, etc.". On the 
other hand, they suggest that "This problem should not greatly affect the estimation of average conduct 
parameters, however, provided that the routes we have selected [in their study] are representative (from the 
cost point of view) of each carrier's total traffic (...)". By using the data disaggregation provided by DAC, and 
by correcting CHARGES variable (in the way I will show below), it is possible to have this representative-route 
assumption without being much arbitrary. 
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concentration, measured at the route level and considering shares of seats available; 
SHSEATSki is firm ki's share of seats available at route level; CURRDEV99 is a dummy 
controlling for periods after the currency devaluation of Jan/1999 (considered as once and for 
all supply shock); NLTSCURDV99 is a dummy that allows for different conduct of the firms 
in the non-loyal-travellers niche after the currency devaluation of Jan/1999; COORDBEHV 
accounts for the period of alleged tacit collusion (Aug/99 up to Dec/99); ALWDPRINCR 
represents the months subsequent to the general price increase allowed by regulators and 
macroeconomic authorities; finally, firm-specific fixed-effects are included and disturbances 
are denoted by ep. 
kiMC
Ù
d represents estimated marginal cost of firm k of group i - calculated as in (4) - 
multiplied by the airport-pair distance. Although it represents system-wide (and not route 
level) costs, relevant problems of measurement may arise when performing the transformation 
of the left-hand side of (11); this is particularly true for the variable CHARGES. It would be 
difficult to defend that sistemwide-level airport charges are a good proxy for route-level 
charges. On the contrary, both SDU and CGH airports have specific taxes levied by 
authorities, which could be considerably higher than average, making the estimation of l 
partially biased, as discussed before. In order to correct this problem, I use airport-specific 
information on taxes (provided by DAC) in order to calculate kiMC
Ù
 (check Appendix 5 for 
more details on CHARGES and MC). 
As one can see, empirical counterpart (11) makes use of variables of route concentration 
(indicating structure of the market) and route market shares (indicating relative market 
positions). This is also performed by other studies, such as Borenstein (1989) and Evans and 
Kessides (1993). By having both variables as regressors it is possible to check the traditional 
theory that high concentration at the route level facilitates collusion, and that dominance over 
available seats and/or flight frequencies gives competitive advantage to carriers24. 
                                               
24 One could also consider dominance at the endpoint airports as conferring market power to airlines, as most US 
studies, for ex. Borenstein (1989) and Berry (1990); however, hub-and-spoke systems are still not widespread in 
Brazil, what surely makes this variable less significant than in the United States. Besides that, as airports are 
state-owned, access to sunk facilities at the endpoints is much easier and less subject to private dominance than 
in the US. 
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Estimation of competition models like (9), (10) and (11) is usually performed in the literature 
by taking into account of the potential endogeneity of some of the variables in the system of 
simultaneous equations. This is especially true for NPASki, Pki, Pj, SHSEATSki, and 
HHISEATS25. OLS estimation in this case would generate biased estimates, and therefore 
two-stage least squares were performed, using as instruments some of the exogenous demand 
and cost variables (GDP, the dummies of code share agreements, and the input prices). 
Actually, one may argue that labour’s prices could be endogenous in such a market with 
highly skilled workforce; however, this effect is certainly not observed in the short-run, 
especially in a period of financial difficulties of all airlines, with recurrent cuts in the 
workforce and control of labour expenditures. Another instrument, used when estimating 
demand, was USDEFF, an index of the price of real US dollar. 
Instruments for available seat market share and concentration were the same measures for 
another market: the airport-pair PLU-BSB, linking the city centre of Belo Horizonte to 
Brasília. Shocks in demand would be correlated with these variables only in case it would be 
possible to transfer flights from one airport-pair to the other in the short-run. This practice is 
more difficult to be performed, however, since airlines may lose conceded slots in case they 
are left vacant. 
One much more reasonable (and allowed) alternative would be to exchange slots in one of the 
endpoints CGH/SDU from or to other origin/destination, in response to a given shock. This 
certainly provides greater flexibility to the airline, besides not letting it lose valuable flight 
time positions. By considering this tactics as more usual in the market, it is possible then to 
defend that instruments can be generated by using an airport-pair that does not have any of the 
endpoints in common with CGH-SDU - in this case, PLU-BSB was chosen. Measures of 
SHSHARE and RHHI on this route were then considered reasonable instruments. 
Estimation results for (8), (9) and (10), are presented in Appendix 5. Results are discussed in 
the next section. 
                                               
25 Check, for example, Evans, Froeb and Werden (1993). 
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5.2.1 Discussion of Results  
Results of the estimation of demand equation are found in Table A.5. One can see that there 
was notable decrease in price elasticities after the Second Round of Liberalisation ("POSLIB" 
column). Indeed, both own and cross-price elasticities decreased by thirty percent on average 
(-26% and -34%, respectively). As emphasised before, in Section 3.2, this is certainly due to 
the effects of explicit efforts of product differentiation and segmentation in the market after 
August 1998. 
Therefore, the observed decrease in price elasticities along with the higher reduction of cross-
price elasticity when compared to own-price elasticity, are phenomena clearly related to the 
observed increase in perceived heterogeneity. This can be seen when extracting the estimated 
measure of product homogeneity - the index Y of equation (2) -, as in Table 4: 
Table 4 - Evolution of Product Differentiation 
bki -1.4409 -1.0600 -26%
bj 1.0784 0.7163 -34%
y 0.5601 0.4566 -18%
Coefficients
Pre-
Liberalisation
Post-
Liberalisation
Variation        
(%)
 
As can be inferred by Table 4, there was a clear rupture in the degree of product 
differentiation after the Second Round of Liberalisation, as coefficient Y decreased from 0.56 
to 0.46 (-18%). This result is consistent with the emergence of the elements of differentiation 
presented in Appendix 2. 
By analysing the pricing equation of Table A.6 one can extract conclusions on three major 
issues: 1. route-specific costs, 2. the impacts of liberalisation on competitive conduct; and 3. 
the influence of structure on performance. 
Firstly, it is important to remember that the coefficient of RELDISTki, l, represents the link 
between sistemwide and route-level costs, adjusting the former for "cost-tapering" effects and 
then permitting the analysis of non-observable marginal costs. As one would expect, signals 
are negative, which means that the lower is route's distance when compared to firm ki's 
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average stage length, the higher are route-specific costs when compared to systemwide level. 
Also, the expected value of l is close to -0.5, defined as the base-case of Brander and Zhang 
(1990). Moreover, one can analyse that for the air shuttle market, in which the average 
RELDIST is 0.60, l being approximately equal to -0.7 means that for each marginal unit 
spent in sistemwide costs there is 1.43 marginal units spent in that specific market.   
Secondly, it is possible to analyse the path of conduct in the market, and to make explicit its 
main determinants found in the sample. Figure 1 below presents the estimated average 
conduct parameter, identified as shown in Appendix 5. 
Figure 1 - Evolution of estimated average conduct parameter (qˆ ) 
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The main point of Figure 1 is related to the impact of the Second Round of Liberalisation on 
conduct: it is quite clear by inspecting the path of qˆ , that the "average degree of 
competitiveness" (Bresnahan, 1989) has increased. Actually, the conduct parameter plunged 
from an average of 1.105 to 0.773 (-30.1%). Results visibly indicate a slightly below-Nash-
equilibrium conduct, what could be related to some (or a mix of) the following factors: 
interference of macroeconomic authorities not allowing free upward price movements after 
the US dollar shock; the fact that TBA became bankrupt and VSP had severe financial 
difficulties after 1999, and forced prices downwards; the entry of a budget airline in the GIG-
 23
CGH market, from 2001 on; and the pressure caused by the close monitoring of competition 
policy authorities.  
Three additional results deserve special comments: the effects of FIRE, CURDEV99 and 
COORDBEHV on conduct. The dummy FIRE represented the periods in which SDU was 
closed (Feb/98 - Jul/98) and when operations were fully transferred to GIG; the observed 
decrease in conduct during this period is related to the price war of March, triggered by the 
expansion of TAM's flight frequencies and deep discounts concession, in a more than 
proportional when compared to the effects of HHISEATS - what is captured by the estimated 
pricing equation (Table A.6).  
With respect to CURDV99 and NLTSCURDV99, one can observe how the supply shock 
caused by the devaluation of the US dollar had different impacts for each group of firms: on 
the one hand, it permitted an increase in conduct for the firms serving the loyal traveller 
segment (marginal effects of 0.227), but, on the other hand, it caused a decrease in conduct 
for firms in the non loyal traveller segment (effects of +0.227-0.450). This was consistent 
with observed pricing policies on the route, and may be due to the aforementioned financial 
difficulties of the latter group, meaning it needed making cash in the short run, despite of 
lower-than-optimum margins. 
Last but not least, the positive marginal effects of the dummy variable COORDBEHV means 
that firms did increased conduct from August 1999, as was alleged by antitrust authorities on 
the occasion26. However, as Figure 1 permits observing, this price coordination was actually 
ineffective, as it did not represented collusive behaviour in terms of a conduct parameter 
much higher than Nash equilibrium benchmark. On the contrary, qˆ  was still lower than 
optimum, and, what is more, it decreased again in January 2000, when VSP cheated the tacit 
agreement and conceded 50% of discounts. 
A final comment must be made regarding the estimated coefficients of HHISEATS and 
SHSEATS in Table A.6. One can observe that, although the former is significant for both 
periods in the sample, that is, pre and post-liberalisation, the later was found significant only 
                                               
26 Actually, all airlines in the market increased prices by the same percentage (10%), on the same day (04-08-
1999). 
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during the liberalised regime. Besides that, marginal effects of SHSEATS became slightly 
higher. This may represent that route dominance became much more relevant after 
liberalisation, especially with the explicit accomplishments of product differentiation in the 
market.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper developed a competition model to investigate the impacts of the Second 
Round of Liberalisation of airline industry in Brazil, on one of its most relevant markets: the 
air shuttle service linking Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo. Structural parameters were then 
estimated in a fixed-effects procedure, in order to permit inference over the degree of product 
differentiation and the pattern of firms' conduct before and after the measures undertaken by 
authorities in the late nineties. 
The main conclusions were a relevant increase in both the degree of competitiveness (the 
estimated conduct parameter decreased by 30%) and the degree of product differentiation in 
the market (the estimated index of homogeneity decreased by 18%), due to regulatory reform. 
The main explanation for the market changes caused by liberalisation were: on the one hand, 
the explicit efforts of demand segmentation and incentives for brand loyalty (especially by 
means of frequent flyer programmes) by a group of airlines, which started offering better 
service levels in conjunction with higher dominance on the route; and, on the other hand, 
other airlines started specialising in providing service to a less loyal segment, with basic 
service and deep discounts. 
Besides that, a supply shock represented by the US dollar devaluation, in January 1999, 
greatly affected the extent to which conduct deviated from Nash behaviour. As firms were not 
able to promptly adjust prices upwards on account of the interference of macroeconomic 
authorities, conduct remained slightly lower than what should be expected in equilibrium. 
Other factors keeping the conduct parameter depressed were the monitoring of antitrust 
authorities and the observed financial difficulties and state of bankruptcy of some of the 
airlines. 
Moreover, estimation permitted analysing the effects of concentration levels and route 
dominance on the pricing of airlines in the shuttle market; both variables indeed proved to 
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permit significant competitive advantage, especially in the new liberalised environment, a fact 
consistent with traditional wisdom in the industry. 
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APPENDIX 1 - EVOLUTION OF REGULATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Phase  Regulation with 
Industrial Policy 
Regulation with Active 
Stabilisation Policy 
Controls 
Liberalisation with 
Inactive Stabilisation 
Policy Controls 
Liberalisation with 
Stabilisation Policy 
Constraint 
Current Status of 
Liberalisation 
Period  1973-1986 1986-1992 1992-1997 1998-2001 2001- 
Economic Policy in 
the Sector 
Regulation Present Present Partially removed: First 
Round of Liberalisation 
Partially Removed: 
Second Round of 
Liberalisation 
Removed: Quasi-
deregulation 
 Macroeconomic 
Interference 
Active Very Active Possible, but not Active Active Absent 
Fares Reference Price Imposed by DAC Imposed by DAC Not imposed by DAC Not imposed by DAC Absent 
 Price Increase Control Present Present, with 
stabilisation policy 
targeting 
Present, but associated 
with industry's inflation 
Present: mix of 
stabilisation policy 
targeting and industry's 
inflation 
Absent 
 Registration Absent Absent ex-ante: 48 hours of 
advance, and 
automatically approved 
if no answer by DAC 
ex-ante: only in case of 
more than 65% discount 
ex-post: only for 
monitoring purposes 
 Fare Bounds Absent Absent until 1988;                            
[-25%,+10%] in 1989;            
[-50%,+32%], from 1990 
on (only for discount 
fares);  
[-50%, +32%]                                                 
(both full and discount 
fares) 
Unbounded Unbounded 
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Phase  Regulation with 
Industrial Policy 
Regulation with Active 
Stabilisation Policy 
Controls 
Liberalisation with 
Inactive Stabilisation 
Policy Controls 
Liberalisation with 
Stabilisation Policy 
Constraint 
Current Status of 
Liberalisation 
Period  1973-1986 1986-1992 1992-1997 1998-2001 2001- 
Entry New Firms Not allowed: "4 nationals 
& 5 regionals" policy 
Not allowed: "4 nationals 
& 5 regionals" policy 
Allowed, both in national 
and regional levels 
Allowed Allowed 
 Regional Monopolies Present Present Absent, with the 
exception of SAP routes 
Absent Absent 
Competition Authority's attitude Avoid Avoid Stimulate Stimulate but with 
antitrust controls 
Stimulate but with 
antitrust controls 
 Among Nationals and 
Regionals 
Absent Absent Allowed, with the 
exception of SAP routes 
Allowed Allowed 
Capacity and 
Infrastructure 
Frequency, Airways and 
Aircrafts 
Controlled based on load 
factors; requests needed 
ex-ante authorisations to 
CLA 
Controlled based on load 
factors; requests needed 
ex-ante authorisations to 
CLA 
Ex-ante authorisation 
(CLA); no economic 
control; priority to 
existing airlines 
Ex-ante authorisation 
(COMCLAR); no 
economic control; 
simpler and faster 
process 
Ex-ante authorisation 
(COMCLAR); no 
economic control; 
simpler and faster 
process 
 Airports and Terminals State-owned enterprise: 
INFRAERO 
State-owned enterprise: 
INFRAERO 
State-owned enterprise: 
INFRAERO; equal 
access to airport facilities 
and terminals. 
State-owned enterprise: 
INFRAERO; equal 
access to airport facilities 
and terminals. 
State-owned enterprise: 
INFRAERO; some 
congested airports 
causing problems of 
access and entry.  
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APPENDIX 2 - PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION ELEMENTS EMERGED AFTER LIBERALISATION 
VRG TAM VSP TBA
Mileage 
Program
"SMILES" "FIDELIDADE" - -
Alliances and 
Mileage 
Exchange
Star Alliance: Air Canada, 
Lufthansa, SAS, Thai e United 
Airlines
American Airlines - -
Counting 
Scheme
Miles Trips - -
Mileage 
Scheme
2000 miles = 20 trips  = 1 free 
travel to any city served in 
Latin America
10 trips = 1 free trip to any city 
served in Brazil
- -
Elite Status
4 Categories; Discounts in taxis 
and car rentals at CGH; express 
check-in
3 Categories; 12 parking hours 
free at CGH; express check-in
- -
Permitted Permitted Not Permitted Not Permitted
Exclusive
One Exclusive / One Shared 
(TAM/VSP/TBA)
Shared (TAM/VSP/TBA) Shared (TAM/VSP/TBA)
42 48 149 146
27 29 90 113
135 134 111 113
B737-300; B737-500; ERJ145 FK-100 B737-300 B737-300
Non Loyal Traveller Segment
Frequent Flyer 
Advantages
Preassigned seats at Check-in
Average Distance Between Flights 
(mins)
Aircraft Type
Departure Lounge
Loyal Traveller Segment
Characteristics
Average Distance Between Flights 
in Peak Hours (mins)
Average Price (Aug/98-Jul/99)
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APPENDIX 3 - SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF OLIVEIRA (2003) 
In this survey, 402 passengers were interviewed at CGH airport and were asked about their 
preferences when choosing an airline in the market. 
 
Table A . 1 - Main Results of the Survey - Disaggregated by Airline 
TOTAL % VRG TAM TBA VSP
Yes 251 62% 80% 70% 33% 36%
No 151 38% 20% 30% 67% 64%
TOTAL % VRG TAM TBA VSP
Myself 144 36% 24% 34% 57% 48%
The institution I represent 256 64% 76% 66% 43% 52%
TOTAL % VRG TAM TBA VSP
Very Much / Much Influence 316 79% 87% 87% 64% 62%
No / Medium Influence 84 21% 13% 13% 36% 38%
TOTAL % VRG TAM TBA VSP
Very Much / Much Influence 228 57% 41% 51% 83% 79%
No / Medium Influence 174 44% 59% 49% 17% 21%
TOTAL % VRG TAM TBA VSP
Very Much / Much Influence 306 77% 80% 76% 70% 75%
No / Medium Influence 95 24% 20% 24% 30% 25%
How does AVAILABLE FLIGHT TIME influence your choice ?
Do you always travel with this airline (LOYAL)?
Who payed for the flight ticket?
How do AIRLINE CHARACTERISTICS influence your choice ?
How does PRICE influence your choice ?
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Table A . 2 - Segments' Different Views about Price 
   Loyal Traveller 122 49% 127 51% 249 100%
   Non-Loyal Traveller 104 69% 47 31% 151 100%
   TOTAL 226 57% 174 44% 400 100%
   Segment
Very High or 
High
Very Low    or 
Low
Overall
Influence of Price
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APPENDIX 4 - PRICING EQUATION AND CONDUCT PARAMETER 
Consider the following first-order conditions for profit maximisation: 
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Then, let us isolate the price term in the left-hand side of the equation: 
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Suppose now there is a parameter q that measures the extent of deviation from Nash 
behaviour (which would be represented by equating marginal revenue to marginal cost): 
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Considering then the following developments: 
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One can reach the following relation: 
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By considering equation (5) of Section 4: 
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Then it is possible to make the following development. Firstly:  
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And then: 
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By renaming some terms, one can obtain: 
kikiki RELDISTPM lnln lj -=  (20) 
Equation (20) is precisely the pricing equation considered for estimation purposes, as one can 
observe in Table A.6 (Appendix 5). 
By regressing (20), it is possible to calculate the estimated conduct parameter for each group 
of firms: 
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(21) 
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APPENDIX 5 - LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE EMPIRICAL MODEL27 
 
Code Name Main 
Source 
Details 
ALWDISC97 Period of 1997 
Summer 
Discounts 
Midia Dummy variable that accounts for the periods of Summer 
discounts permitted by the pooling agreement on the route. 
ALWDPRINCR Allowed Price 
Increase 
DAC Represents the months subsequent to the general price increase 
allowed by regulators and macroeconomic authorities (from 
Aug/2000). 
ASZ Average 
Aircraft Size 
DAC Calculated using the size (number of seats) of each aircraft model 
in the market, and kilometres flown as weights.  DAC provides 
the information of aircraft types and kilometres flown 
disaggregated by flight. 
CDSHVPTB 1,2 Codeshare 
agreement 
Media Dummies for the periods of codeshare agreements VSP-TBA. 
CDSHVPTB1 accounts for effects in VSP-TBA's demand and 
CDSHVPTB2, in TAM-VRG's demand. 
CHARGES Unit Cost of 
Airport 
Charges 
DAC A proxy for unit price of airport changes. Calculated by dividing 
expenditures on airport charges by LANDINGS. Check CREW 
for information on disaggregation, deflation process, and 
currency. Specific CGH and SDU charges were calculated by 
using method provided by DAC, which considers the class of the 
airport, the maximum takeoff weight of aircrafts, the usual 
number of hours of parking during a night, and the usual waiting 
gate time. 
COORDBEHV Effect of 
Coordinated 
Behaviour 
Media Dummy variable to accounts for the period of alleged tacit 
collusion (Aug/99 up to Dec/99) by all firms in the market. They 
all increased their price on the same day (4-Aug) by the same 
amount (10%). 
 
                                               
27 Every variable is available in a monthly basis (period: Jan/1997 - Oct/2001) and is disaggregated by airline. 
When calculations were performed, they were made by the author, and not by the main source. Note that some 
variables may not be found in the empirical model, but instead, were used to calculate other variables.  
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Code Name Main 
Source 
Details 
CREW Unit Cost of 
Labour 
DAC A proxy for unit price of crew. Calculated by dividing 
expenditures on crew wages by NCREW. Information on 
expenditures disaggregated by airline is provided by DAC for the 
sistemwide, domestic, level. Expenditures are deflated by a 
general wholesale price index (FGV's IPA) in order to represent 
current figures of Jan/2002. Figures are in Brazilian currency (R$, 
reais). 
CURDV99 Currency 
Devaluation 
Central 
Bank 
Dummy variable controlling for periods after the currency 
devaluation, from Jan/1999 on. Variables are built considering 
shocks as once and for all. Check NLTSCURDV99. 
F Flight 
Frequency 
DAC Number of flight frequencies on an average day. Calculated by 
using the expression: F = kilometres flown / (stage length x 
number of days in a given month). Kilometres flown 
disaggregated by airline is available by DAC, and the stage length 
is 365 km. 
FIRE Effects of 
Closed SDU 
Media Dummy that controls the period of closed SDU(Feb/1998 - 
Jul/1998), due to a fire. 
FUEL Unit Cost of 
Fuel 
DAC A proxy for unit price of fuel. Calculated by dividing 
expenditures on fuel by FUELCONS. Check CREW for 
information on disaggregation, deflation process, and currency. 
FUELCONS Consumption 
of Fuel 
DAC Thousands of litres of aviation fuel (mainly aviation kerosene). 
Information disaggregated by airline. Not route-specific, but 
sistemwide (domestic) level. 
GDP Gross 
Domestic 
Product Index 
IPEA 
DATA 
Index of real gross domestic product (Jan/1997 = 100) 
HOURS Number of 
Flight Hours 
DAC Information disaggregated by airline. Not route-specific, but 
sistemwide (domestic) level. 
LANDINGS Number of 
Landings 
DAC Information disaggregated by airline. Not route-specific, but 
sistemwide (domestic) level. 
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Code Name Main 
Source 
Details 
MAINT Unit Cost of 
Maintenance 
DAC A proxy for unit price of maintenance. Calculated by dividing 
expenditures on maintenance by HOURS. Check CREW for 
information on disaggregation, deflation process, and currency. 
MC Marginal Cost  Marginal cost - calculated as in function (4) of Section 4, and 
measured in the sistemwide (aircraft-specific) level. Check Q for 
the unit of measurement. 
NTLSCURDV99 Currency 
Devaluation 
Central 
Bank 
Dummy variable controlling for different conduct of VSP-TBA in 
the periods after the currency devaluation, from Jan/1999 on. 
Check CURDV99. 
NCREW Number of 
Crew Staff 
DAC Headcount of flight crew (deck and attendants), published yearly 
by DAC. Monthly data was built by arithmetic extrapolation. 
NPAS Number of 
passengers 
carried 
DAC The airline revenue traffic excluding people travelling for free for 
any reason. 
P Average 
market price 
ATPCO Real prices, that is, prices deflated by a general consumer price 
index (IBGE's IPCA) in order to represent current figures of 
Jan/2002. Prices are expressed in Brazilian currency (reais, R$). 
Average market price, P, is calculated by weighting airline's 
average prices by their respective NPAS and is measured at the 
route level. 
Pki Price of firm k 
in group i 
ATPCO Airline-specific average real prices, calculated by weighting the 
peak price (full fare) and off-peak prices (simple average of 
available discounts) by respective NPAS. DAC provides the 
information of NPAS disaggregated by airline / flight / day / 
departure time. For information on peak hours, check PDOM. For 
information on the deflation process, check P. 
Pj Price of rival 
airlines (group 
j) 
ATPCO Group-specific average real prices, calculated by the prices of 
each airline in group j by respective NPAS. Check P and Pki for 
more information. 
PDOM Peak 
Dominance 
DAC Peak dominance index, that is, the share of flight frequencies 
during peak time (all flights except those with departure from 
10am to 4.30pm on weekdays, those on Saturdays, and those with 
departure from 7pm on Sundays). DAC provides the information 
of flight number / weekdays / departure times, which made 
possible the segregation into two periods. 
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Code Name Main 
Source 
Details 
Q Sistemwide 
Output 
DAC Number of available seat-kilometres (ASK) in the domestic 
segment of the Brazilian airline industry. DAC provides 
information disaggregated by airline. 
RELDIST Distance over 
Average Stage 
Length 
DAC RELDIST represents d / kid  of equation (7), that is, an index of 
airport-pair distance divided by firm's average stage length.  
Average stage length data is provided by DAC. 
RENTAL Unit Cost of 
Aircraft Rental 
and Insurance 
DAC A proxy for unit price of flight equipment rental and insurance. 
Calculated by dividing expenditures on rental plus insurance by 
HOURS. Check CREW for information on disaggregation, 
deflation process, and currency. 
RHHI Industry 
Concentration 
DAC Herfindhal index of concentration. Calculated by using airlines' 
RPK market shares. 
SEATS Number of 
Available 
seats 
DAC Available seats carried are calculated multiplying ASZ by F by 
the number of days in a given month. 
SHSEATS Share of 
Available 
Seats 
DAC Firm's share of available number of seats (check SEATS). 
USDEFF Real US 
Dollar 
IPEA 
DATA 
Index of real currency exchange US dollar / real (Jan 1997 = 100). 
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APPENDIX 6 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND CODES 
Code Description
BSB Brasília Airport
CGH Congonhas Airport, São Paulo (the closest to the city centre)
DAC Department of Civil Aviation of Brazil
GIG
Galeão /A.C.Jobim Airport, Rio de Janeiro (outskirts, 
international gateway)
PLU
Pampulha Airport, Belo Horizonte (the closest to the city 
centre)
RJ Rio de Janeiro (city)
SDU
Santos Dumont Airport, Rio de Janeiro (the closest to the city 
centre)
SP São Paulo (city)
TAM Tam (airline)
TBA Transbrasil (airline)
VPTB Revenue pooling/codeshare agreement between VSP and TBA
VRG Varig (airline)
VSP Vasp (airline)
CRZ Cruzeiro (airline)
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APPENDIX 7 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY GROUP OF AIRLINES 
 
 
Table A . 3 Statistics - Pre Liberalisation 
MEAN STDEV MIN MAX MEAN STDEV MIN MAX
NPASki (thousands) 23.1 9.1 10.2 42.5 9.0 5.0 4.0 29.0
SHSEATSki (%) 24.4 2.2 17.6 27.1 14.3 7.4 6.9 37.7
Pki 174.7 23.1 135.9 199.5 179.1 27.8 124.5 199.5
Pj 179.5 27.1 127.6 199.5 174.9 23.2 135.9 199.5
RELDISTki 0.636 0.209 0.405 0.981 0.621 0.041 0.523 0.700
TCki (millions) 64.0 23.4 32.0 105.8 69.7 13.5 48.2 108.8
FUELki (cents) 45.5 6.3 29.6 56.8 54.5 13.8 40.5 91.2
MAINTki 1,260.8 326.1 477.0 1,836.3 620.4 198.3 373.0 1,456.5
CREWki (thousands) 17.7 5.0 8.0 26.6 13.7 2.8 9.5 22.5
RENTALki 1,061.6 596.6 265.7 2,222.9 1,356.6 191.1 1,012.4 1,792.1
CHARGESki 1,073.5 258.0 528.8 1,670.7 507.9 50.0 344.9 608.0
Qki (millions) 618.4 217.3 381.1 1050.7 313.6 61.3 213.8 450.9
Ponte Aérea Regionals
Variable
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Table A . 4 - Statistics - Post Liberalisation 
MEAN STDEV MIN MAX MEAN STDEV MIN MAX
NPASki (thousands) 50.9 18.6 20.3 91.2 18.1 7.4 5.7 31.6
SHSEATSki (%) 38.9 7.7 22.2 56.9 14.5 3.9 7.7 25.6
Pki 173.4 38.6 123.6 267.7 109.3 15.5 76.2 135.9
Pj 107.3 13.5 76.9 135.9 163.3 34.2 130.8 243.8
RELDISTki 0.574 0.142 0.418 0.914 0.592 0.110 0.472 0.868
TCki (millions) 107.2 17.9 79.4 156.1 47.5 10.0 28.9 93.5
FUELki (cents) 51.2 16.3 26.0 88.9 53.9 15.9 33.3 94.6
MAINTki 1,188.8 214.5 761.6 1,635.9 1,356.5 517.9 423.2 2,692.3
CREWki (thousands) 13.4 3.3 9.2 24.4 17.2 5.3 2.6 38.1
RENTALki 1,302.6 416.3 438.6 2,394.7 1,118.6 705.9 200.9 2,817.1
CHARGESki 568.6 103.9 351.5 800.1 773.9 205.7 490.3 1,668.0
Qki (millions) 727.1 257.8 358.9 1091.8 506.8 87.0 245.6 629.0
FF Segment NFF Segment
Variable
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APPENDIX 8 - RESULTS OF ESTIMATION 
Table A . 5 - Demand Equation 
   Constant -10.565 *** -16.205 ***
   ln P ki -1.441 ** -1.060 ***
   ln P j 1.078 * 0.716 ***
   ln GDP 2.715 *** 3.464 ***
   ln SHSEAT ki 0.901 *** 1.582 ***
   CDSHVPTP1 0.344 ***
   CDSHVPTB2 -0.336 ***
   TAM -0.920 *** -0.699 ***
   TBA -0.924 *** -0.670 ***
   VSP -0.505 *** -0.758 ***
   RSL -0.696 ***
   ADJ. R-SQUARED
   OBS
(0.135)
(0.114)
ln NPASki
PRELIB POSLIB
(0.300)
(0.040)
(0.128)
(0.044)
0.827
276
(0.085)
(0.033) (0.227)
(0.033) (0.192)
0.946
190
Dependent Variable
(2.438)(1.722)
(0.638)
(0.624)
(0.299)
(0.231)
(0.168)
(0.502)
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10% level,   ** Significant at 5% level,   *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table A . 6 - Pricing Equation 
   Constant 0.391 1.853 *** -0.798 *
   ln RELDIST ki -0.721 *** -0.671 *** -0.717 ***
   ln ALWDISC97 -0.195 *** -0.170 ***
   ln HHISEATS 0.607 ** 0.557 *** 0.549 **
   ln SHSEATS ki 0.463 0.674 ***
   FIRE -0.144 *** -0.132 ***
   CURDV99 0.227 ***
   NLTSCURDV99 -0.450 ***
   COORDBEHV 0.197 ***
   ALWDPRINCR 0.107 ***
   TAM -0.150 * -0.258 *** 0.147 ***
   TBA 0.775 ***
   VSP 0.972 ***
   RSL 0.407 -0.072 *** 0.549 **
   ADJ. R-SQUARED
   OBS
Dependent Variable
(0.035) (0.025)
(0.042)(0.048)
(0.099) (0.458)
(0.054)
(0.267)
(0.042)
(0.243) (0.193)
(0.061)
(0.064)
190 276
0.545
(0.033)
190
0.701 0.788
(0.143)
(0.375) (0.020) (0.267)
(0.087) (0.020) (0.046)
(0.127)
ln PMki
(0.360) (0.104)
PRELIB         
with             
SHSEATS
PRELIB 
without 
SHSEATS
POSLIB
(0.031) (0.088)
(1.112)
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10% level,   ** Significant at 5% level,   *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table A . 7 - Total Costs Equation 
   Constant -6.074 ***
   ln FUEL ki 0.246 ***
   ln MAINT ki 0.175 ***
   ln CREW ki 0.068 ***
   ln RENTAL ki 0.200 ***
   ln CHARGES ki 0.058 ***
   ln Q ki 0.787 ***
   TBA -0.295 ***
   VSP -0.386 ***
   TAM -0.693 ***
   DAB*ln Q ki 0.093 ***
   DFK*ln Q ki 0.130 ***
   ADJ. R-SQUARED
   OBS
Dependent Variable
ln TCki
(0.212)
(0.021)
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.019)
(0.015)
(0.009)
0.994
300
(0.098)
(0.017)
(0.023)
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10% level,   ** Significant at 5% level,   *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
